The gallows in Iran do not move at the pace of justice; they move at the speed of political desperation. In the early hours of this morning, Tehran confirmed the execution of two individuals allegedly linked to the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MEK). While state media frames these killings as a legal response to terrorism, the timing and the nature of the charges tell a far more cynical story. These are not isolated criminal punishments. They are carefully timed psychological operations designed to paralyze a population that has grown increasingly bold in its defiance of the clerical establishment.
The two men, identified as Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani, had been held since 2022—the year the "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests shook the foundations of the Islamic Republic. By dragging these cases out and then executing them now, the judiciary is sending a clear signal that the state’s memory is long and its appetite for retribution remains unsated. For another view, read: this related article.
The Machinery of the Revolutionary Court
To understand why these executions happen, you have to look past the official charge sheets. In the Iranian legal system, the Revolutionary Courts operate outside the norms of the regular judiciary. There is no right to choose a lawyer from an independent bar association. There is no transparency. Most trials last less than fifteen minutes.
The primary charge used in these cases is Moharebeh, or "enmity against God." It is a vague, catch-all legal instrument that allows the state to equate political dissent with a divine offense. When a defendant is accused of being a Mohareb, the evidence is often secondary to the political necessity of the verdict. Similar analysis on this trend has been provided by USA Today.
In the case of Ehsani and Hassani, the state claimed they were involved in "espionage and organized efforts" for the MEK. Whether or not the individuals held any functional ties to the group is almost irrelevant to the state's objective. By labeling dissidents as members of an exiled opposition group, the regime attempts to strip them of local sympathy, painting them as foreign agents rather than internal critics.
The Geography of Repression
These executions are concentrated in regions where the government feels most vulnerable. While Tehran is the political heart, the periphery—areas with significant ethnic minority populations or history of labor unrest—often sees the highest density of death sentences.
The state uses the death penalty as a tool of territorial control. By executing individuals in different provinces, the judiciary ensures that the shadow of the noose reaches every corner of the country. It is a grim form of communication. It says that no matter how far you are from the capital, the reach of the Ministry of Intelligence is absolute.
Why the MEK Label is a Recurring Theme
The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) has been the regime's primary "bogeyman" since the 1980s. For the veteran analysts watching this, the recurrence of MEK-related charges is a classic play from the 1988 playbook, when thousands of political prisoners were executed in a matter of weeks.
The regime uses the MEK label for three specific reasons:
- Dehumanization: Because the MEK fought alongside Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, the label "MEK member" is used to trigger a visceral reaction of "traitor" among the older, more conservative base of the regime.
- Legal Shortcut: Proving specific acts of domestic sabotage is difficult. Proving "affiliation" with a banned group is a much lower bar for a Revolutionary Court judge to clear.
- Diplomatic Leverage: When Western nations criticize Iran’s human rights record, Tehran points to these labels to claim they are simply fighting a terrorist organization, mirroring the rhetoric used in the West’s own security narratives.
The Cost of Silence from the International Community
The global response to these executions follows a predictable and largely ineffective pattern. We see the "deep concern" expressed by the UN and the standard condemnations from the European Union. However, for the men sitting in Ward 4 of Evin Prison, these statements are worth nothing.
The Iranian leadership has calculated the "cost" of an execution. They know that a few days of bad headlines and a symbolic sanction on a mid-level prison official is a small price to pay for the domestic stability that fear provides. Unless there is a direct, tangible cost to the diplomatic or economic interests of the ruling elite, the gallows will continue to work overtime.
The reality is that execution numbers have spiked under the current administration. This isn't a sign of strength; it’s a sign of a regime that has lost its ability to govern through consent and must now rely entirely on coercion. When a state begins killing its citizens for their political associations, it has admitted that it can no longer win the argument.
The Psychological Toll on the Iranian Public
What is often missed by foreign observers is the "secondary execution"—the trauma inflicted on the families and the wider community. Families are often not told of the execution until after it has happened. They are frequently denied the right to a public funeral. In some cases, the state even charges the family for the "cost" of the rope or the execution process before releasing the body.
This cruelty is intentional. It is designed to ensure that the mourning process is private, quiet, and filled with shame rather than becoming a new flashpoint for protest.
The Failure of Internal Reform
For years, some argued that the Iranian judiciary could be reformed from within. They pointed to "moderate" factions who might limit the use of the death penalty. That illusion has vanished. The judiciary is now more than ever a direct extension of the Supreme Leader’s office.
The legal system is not broken; it is functioning exactly as it was designed. It is a filter meant to remove anyone who poses a threat to the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). To expect this system to suddenly embrace due process is to misunderstand the fundamental nature of the Islamic Republic.
Data and Discrepancies
Official numbers from the Iranian state never tell the whole story. Human rights organizations often record twice as many executions as the state officially acknowledges.
| Year | Officially Reported | Estimated Actual | Primary Charges |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 480 | 830+ | Drug offenses, Moharebeh |
| 2024 | 310 (to date) | 550+ | Security crimes, Blasphemy |
The discrepancy exists because many executions take place in "secret" in provincial prisons like those in Mashhad or Zahedan. These are not publicized because they are not meant for international consumption; they are meant to cow specific local populations.
The Strategy of Escalation
We are currently seeing a strategy of "escalated normalcy." The regime is trying to make frequent executions so commonplace that the international media stops reporting on them. If an execution happens every day, it ceases to be news. This is the danger zone. When the world looks away, the pace of the hangings will only increase.
The two men executed today were not the first, and they will not be the last. There are currently dozens of others on death row for "crimes" that involve nothing more than posting on social media or attending a street rally. The legal architecture is in place to liquidate an entire generation of activists if the regime feels its survival is at stake.
Necessary Steps for Global Actors
If the international community wants to do more than just issue press releases, the focus must shift. Sanctioning the judges by name is a start, but it doesn't stop the rope.
- Universal Jurisdiction: European and North American legal systems should use universal jurisdiction to prosecute Iranian officials who travel abroad and are linked to these executions.
- Diplomatic Downgrading: Recalling ambassadors specifically in response to execution waves sends a message that "business as usual" is over.
- Support for VPNs and Information Flow: The state relies on the darkness. Ensuring Iranians have the tools to document and broadcast these trials in real-time is the best defense against secret executions.
The hangman's noose is the regime's final argument. As long as the Revolutionary Courts can kill with impunity, the cycle of protest and bloody crackdown will remain the defining feature of the Iranian political landscape. The men executed today are gone, but the conditions that led to their "crimes"—the desire for a life free from theocratic dictate—remain as potent as ever.
The gallows may kill the person, but they have never succeeded in killing the grievance.
